

9E1A

OEXA 82-2015
26 August 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Director, Office of External Affairs

SUBJECT: International Exchange Program

1. Action Requested: That you approve Senator Charles McC. Mathias' (R., MD) request for a Tuncelon meeting with you at Headquarters with Senator Jim Sasser (D., TN), Dr. Daniel Boorstin, Library of Congress, Eugene Rostow, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Bob Gates, DDI, for the purpose of briefing Senator Sasser on the benefits the Agency derives from the International Exchange Program (IEP).

2. Background:


a. The International Exchange Program (44 U.S.C. Sec. 1719, Tab A) provides the Library of Congress with official Government documents from all nations of the world in exchange for U.S. Government publications. The recipient of the Program is the Library of Congress who administers it in cooperation with the Smithsonian Institution and the Government Printing Office. The Program has had recurring funding problems in the past few years (see memorandum, Tab B) and Congress has also questioned parts of it by proposing in the Conte Amendment (96th Congress) to prohibit the U.S. Government from engaging in any Government document exchange program with the USSR, Cuba, and Iran. The former DCI, Admiral Turner, in a memorandum of 26 September 1980 to Representative Conte (Tab C) went on record against his Amendment. The DDI, then D/NFAC, also alerted the Legislative Counsel about the dangers of the Conte Amendment in a 7 August 1980 memorandum (Tab D).

b. The threat posed by the "Conte Amendment" in the 96th Congress is aptly described in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the memorandum attached at Tab D. Arguably, the same concerns would manifest themselves should the funding problems not be resolved.


c. Senator Mathias, Vice Chairman of the Joint Committee on the Library, is asking our assistance in attempting to convince Senator Sasser of the need for the Program to continue, however funded. Senator Sasser, who sits on the Appropriations, Budget and Governmental Affairs Committees apparently is objecting to the Program being an item in the legislative budget. Senator Mathias, on the other hand, would like to see the Library of Congress take over responsibility for the Program, vice the Smithsonian. The Library of Congress has no objection to this. Such a change in responsibility may entail legislation to amend 44 U.S.C. Sec. 1719.

State Dept. review completed

3. Recommendation: That you agree to the requested luncheon meeting and ask the DDI to be present to brief Messrs. Mathias, Sasser, Rostow and Boorstin.


Director, Office of External Affairs

Attachments:
As stated

Approve 

Disapprove _____

 Date 3 SEP 1982

DCI

*Good idea - I'd
like to sit in also*

J

Ch. 17

DISTRIBUTION AND SALE 44 § 1718

§ 1716. Public documents for legations and consulates of United States

Only books published by the Government, and usually known by the name of "Public Documents", may be supplied to a legation or consulate of the United States as are first designated by the Secretary of State, by an order to be recorded in the State Department, as suitable for and required by the legation and consulate. Pub.L. 90-620, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1281.

Historical and Revision Notes

Reviser's Note. Based on 44 U.S.Code, 1964 ed., § 91a (U.S. § 504). **Legislative History.** For legislative history and purpose of Pub.L. 90-620, see 1968 U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p. 4438.

§ 1717. Documents and reports for foreign legations

Documents and reports may be furnished to foreign legations to the United States upon request stating those desired and requisition upon the Public Printer by the Secretary of State. Gratuitous distribution may only be made to legations whose Governments furnish to legations from the United States copies of their printed and legislative documents desired.

Pub.L. 90-620, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1281.

Historical and Revision Notes

Reviser's Note. Based on 44 U.S.Code, 1964 ed., § 91 (Jan. 12, 1955, ch. 23, § 75, 28 Stat. 620). **Legislative History.** For legislative history and purpose of Pub.L. 90-620, see 1968 U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p. 4438.

Cross References

Congressional Record, gratuitous copies, see section 906 of this title.

Library References

Ambassadors and Consuls 2 et seq. C.J.S. Ambassadors and Consuls § 12 et seq.

§ 1718. Distribution of Government publications to the Library of Congress

There shall be printed and furnished to the Library of Congress for official use in the District of Columbia, and for international exchange as provided by section 1719 of this title, not to exceed one hundred and fifty copies of:

House documents and reports, bound;

Senate documents and reports, bound;

T. 44 U.S.C.A.—10

44 § 1718 PUBLIC PRINTING AND DOCUMENTS Ch. 17

Senate and House journals, bound;
public bills and resolutions;
the United States Code and supplements, bound; and
all other publications and maps which are printed, or otherwise reproduced, under authority of law, upon the requisition of a Congressional committee, executive department, bureau, independent office, establishment, commission, or officer of the Government.

Confidential matter, blank forms, and circular letters not of a public character shall be excepted.

In addition, there shall be delivered as printed to the Library of Congress:

- ten copies of each House document and report, unbound;
- ten copies of each Senate document and report, unbound;
- and
- ten copies of each private bill and resolution and fifty copies of the laws in slip form.

Pub.L. 90-620, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1282.

Historical and Revision Notes

Reviser's Note. Based on 44 U.S.Code, 1964 ed., § 139 (Jan. 28, 1899, No. 12, 30 Stat. 1383; Mar. 2, 1901, No. 16, §§ 1, 2, 31 Stat. 1464; June 20, 1936, ch. 630, title IV, § 6, 49 Stat. 1550).

Reference to the Official Register is omitted as obsolete. The authorization

for its compilation was repealed by Public Law 89-626.

Legislative History. For legislative history and purpose of Pub.L. 90-620, see 1968 U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p. 4438.

Cross References

American Printing House for the Blind, books for Library of Congress, see section 105 of Title 20, Education.
Geological Survey reports, distribution of two additional copies to the Library of Congress, see section 1315 of this title.
House and Senate documents and reports, distribution to the Library of Congress, see section 701 of this title.

Library References

United States 43.

C.J.S. United States §§ 57, 58.

§ 1719. International exchange of Government publications

For the purpose of more fully carrying into effect the convention concluded at Brussels on March 15, 1886, and proclaimed by the President of the United States on January 15, 1889, there shall be supplied to the Library of Congress not to exceed one hundred and twenty-five copies each of all Government publications, including

Ch. 17

DISTRIBUTION AND SALE

44 § 1720

the daily and bound copies of the Congressional Record, for distribution, through the Smithsonian Institution, to foreign governments which agree to send to the United States similar publications of their governments for delivery to the Library of Congress.

Pub.L. 90-620, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1282.

Historical and Revision Notes

Reviser's Note. Based on 44 U.S.Code, 1964 ed., § 139a (Mar. 2, 1901, No. 16, § 3, 31 Stat. 1465; Mar. 3, 1925, ch. 421, § 7, 43 Stat. 1107; June 20, 1938, ch. 630, title IV, § 6, 49 Stat. 1550).

References in Text. There were two conventions concluded at Brussels on Mar. 15, 1886, and proclaimed by the President on Jan. 15, 1889: one was a convention "for the international ex-

change of official documents, scientific, and literary publications"; the other was "for the immediate exchange of the official journals, parliamentary annals, and documents."

Legislative History. For legislative history and purpose of Pub.L. 90-620, see 1968 U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p. 4438.

Cross References

Congressional Record, gratuitous copies, see section 906 of this title.
Housing and urban planning and development data, exchange and assembly by participation in international conferences, see section 1701-4 of Title 12, Banks and Banking.

United States information and educational exchange programs, interchanges between United States and other countries of books and periodicals, including government publications, and other educational material, see section 1447 of Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse.

Library References

United States 59.

C.J.S. United States §§ 75, 79.

§ 1720. Documents not needed by departments to be turned over to Superintendent of Documents

Public documents accumulating in the several executive departments, bureaus, and offices, not needed for official use, shall be turned over to the Superintendent of Documents annually for distribution or sale.

Pub.L. 90-620, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1282.

Historical and Revision Notes

Reviser's Note. Based on 44 U.S.Code, 1964 ed., § 78 (Jan. 12, 1905, ch. 23, § 67, 38 Stat. 611).

Legislative History. For legislative history and purpose of Pub.L. 90-620, see 1968 U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p. 4438.

Library References

United States 43, 58.

C.J.S. United States §§ 57, 58, 75, 79.

3891-82-
10 May 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM : Clarus W. Rice
Director of Central Reference
SUBJECT : The International Exchange Program

1. At your request I met with the Librarian of Congress, Dr. Daniel Boorstin, and representatives from GPO, State, the Smithsonian Institution, and staff members from the House Appropriations Committee and from Senator Mathias' office to discuss (a) the serious funding problems facing the US Government's International Exchange Program, and (b) what agency should be responsible for defending future funding for the Program.

2. The International Exchange Program provides the Library of Congress with official government documents from all nations of the world in exchange for US Government publications. The recipient of the Program is the Library of Congress who administers it in cooperation with the Smithsonian Institution (who has current statutory responsibility for the Program) and the Government Printing Office. The Program has had recurring funding problems in the past few years and Congress has also questioned parts of it by proposing in the Conte Amendment (which failed) to prohibit the US Government from engaging in any government document exchange program with the USSR, Cuba, and Iran. The former DCI, Admiral Turner, in a memorandum of 26 September 1980 to Representative Conte (attached) went on record against his Amendment. The DDI, then D/NFAC, also alerted the Legislative Counsel about the dangers of the Conte Amendment in a 7 August 1980 memorandum (attached).

3. This Agency utilizes the materials received by the Library of Congress under the Exchange Program by examining the material at the Library and borrowing it for exploitation by FBIS and DDI offices. The material would have to be purchased overseas if it were not available at the Library of Congress.

4. The Program faces immediate funding needs. The amount of money allocated to it by the Smithsonian was completely obligated by the end of CY 1981. As a result, the last four months of US Government publications to be distributed are piling up at a GPO warehouse at the rate of one tractor trailer per week. The Librarian of Congress estimates that there is a current \$130K shortfall for FY 82 and that \$292K will be needed to fund the Program in FY 83. Savings are anticipated in FY 83 and beyond because the GPO plans to convert to microfiche in the future resulting in major savings in printing, binding, and shipping costs.

This document may be
downgraded to unclassified
when attachment is removed

SUBJECT: The International Exchange Program

5. The FY 82 funding impasse was to have been resolved by the Smithsonian Institution requesting supplemental funds. This was not done. Dr. Boorstin outlined four alternatives:

a. that State Department assume responsibility for the defense of the Program in its budget;

b. that GPO be given statutory responsibility and the funds for the Program;

c. that the Smithsonian Institution continue its role and request a supplemental to cover FY 82 funding deficiencies and to program FY 83 funding to cover the cost of the Program;

d. that the Library of Congress fund and control the Program.

6. There was a lot of jockeying between the representatives. It is very evident that State Department wants no part of the Program. The Smithsonian representative expressed a willingness to continue the Program but stressed a need for funding. The GPO representative said something must be done immediately to eliminate the high storage costs. The Librarian of Congress was concerned that exchange relationships that had been built up over the years with the Soviet Union, the PRC, and 72 other countries would be seriously jeopardized if the FY 82 funding problem and the long term decision as to where the Program should eventually be administered were not resolved.

7. The Smithsonian representative proposed that they would be able to recover from year-end funds approximately \$25-50K to cover the \$130K FY 82 shortfall. They asked representatives around the table if funding could be obtained from their agencies to cover the remaining shortfall. Dr. Boorstin pressed me for Intelligence Community support to cover all or part of the remaining deficit. I pointed out that we do benefit some from the Program, and that I would determine if any funding could be obtained for the FY 82 shortfall. I pointed out, however, that this recurring funding problem should be resolved, and that the Program really is an exchange program between our national library (the Library of Congress) and the national libraries of other countries. The logical place for the Program is the Library of Congress which is the strongest beneficiary of it. No one disagreed with this but pointed out that the Library of Congress is in the Legislative Branch and that this is an Executive Branch program.

8. I recommend the following:

a. that CIA (OCR) offer \$25K of funds to cover part of the FY 82 shortfall. This would demonstrate good faith on the part of the Agency. We have a unique relationship with the Library of Congress--they provide better service to this Agency than they do to other parts of the Government. In making this transfer of funds, the Agency should make it clear, however, that this is a one-time funding assistance and not an annual one.

SUBJECT: The International Exchange Program


b. that I contact the IC Staff to determine if other agencies within the Intelligence Community are willing to assist the Smithsonian and the Library of Congress with the FY 82 funding deficit.

Clarus W. Rice

Attachments: a/s

cc: C/LLB/OEA
DDCI
DCI

APPROVED:




Pending ExDir/DDCI
(Concurrence)

5/11/82
Date

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Distribution:

- Orig - Addressee, return to originator
- 1 - Addressee, w/att
- 1 - ADDI, w/att
- 1 - DDI Registry, w/o att
- 1 - C/LY/OCR, w/att
- 2 - OD/OCR, w/att

DDI/OCR/OD:CWRice:jh  (7May82)

80-7864/2

OLC 80-1669/E

26 SEP 1980

Honorable Silvio O. Conte
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Conte:

This letter addresses the issue of United States Government publications, including unclassified Central Intelligence Agency publications, being made available to foreign governments under an international exchange program, authority for which is contained in title 44 of the U.S.C., sections 1718 - 1719.

As the Director of the Central Intelligence I share your concern about the transfer of any information to any country which may prove detrimental to the national security interests of the United States. Indeed, I have spent a great deal of time and effort stressing, in public forums and before Congressional Committees, the importance of limiting the proliferation of sensitive intelligence information.

However, in my opinion, a select, methodical review of material the United States releases would be much more sensible, in terms of the foreign intelligence mission of the United States, than a blanket proscription, of the type you introduced on the House floor as an amendment to the FY 81 Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, against any exchange at all with the Soviet Union, Cuba, or Iran.

The procedures which the Central Intelligence Agency has instituted to insure that materials earmarked for the exchange are done so in a manner totally in conformance with the applicable law and sound security practices are quite stringent. No CIA publication is made available to the exchange without having first been: personally reviewed by the Deputy Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center; coordinated with the Department of State and the

National Security Council to the extent that policy matters are involved; and subsequently, but still prior to release, personally reviewed by me. Moreover, I can assure you that the exchange has contributed significantly to our being able to provide our government's policymakers with the kind of information they need to better understand the issues they are faced with on a daily basis. Accordingly, I would urge you to seriously consider the effect of the retention of your amendment in either the continuing resolution currently being discussed by the Congress or in the subsequent permanent legislation to be taken up just prior to the expiration of the continuing resolution.

I salute your efforts to insure that sensitive intelligence information is not subject to unwarranted proliferation.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Stansfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER

cc: Honorable Adam Benjamin, Chairman
House Appropriations Subcommittee on
Legislative Branch

Honorable Jim Sasser
Senate Appropriations Committee

Distribution:

Original - Addressee
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - D/NFAC
1 - OLC
1 - NFAC Registry

Administrative - Internal Use Only

NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

NFAC 55-22-80

SLC #82-1699/2

Director

7 AUG 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Legislative Counsel

ATTENTION :

SUBJECT : The "Conte" Amendment to the FY 1981 Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill

REFERENCE : Your memorandum, dated 1 August 1980, Same Subject

1. This memorandum is a coordinated NFAC reply to the referent on the Conte Amendment, which would prohibit the United States Government from engaging in a government document exchange program with the USSR, Cuba and Iran.

2. The government document exchange with the Soviet Union that would be abolished by Representative Conte's Amendment is one of several major exchange programs between the Library of Congress (LC) and the USSR. The publications exchanged under this agreement are commercially available from both countries. In return for a complete set of Government Printing Office (GPO) documents, the USSR provides LC with subscriptions to 1,000 Soviet newspapers and journals. Because these periodicals are available through subscription, this exchange program has little direct value for NFAC.

3. Possible retaliatory actions by the USSR, however, could have an impact and it is this possibility that concerns NFAC. The degree of centralized publication control available to the Soviet government could support a total and complete restriction on direct open-source procurement by US Government agencies, including procurement by the Embassy Publications Procurement Officer in Moscow. Other exchange programs between LC and libraries and institutes in the USSR might also be affected if the Soviets enforce comprehensive reprisals. These latter programs are productive sources of publications not available through other means, especially for monographs in the scientific and technical fields. Thus, restrictive Congressional actions could have far ranging results more damaging to the Intelligence Community than might be anticipated initially.

STAT

Administrative - Internal Use Only

SUBJECT: The "Conte" Amendment to the FY 1981 Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill

4. Because the US material involved is openly available, the Soviets would not be hampered seriously by the Conte Amendment. They could purchase US Government publications from GPO and the US Department of Commerce's National Technical Information Service, or obtain them through other exchange arrangements with major US libraries, universities, or institutes.

5. The Conte Amendment also would preclude exchanges with Iran and Cuba. Currently nothing is being exchanged with Iran. Recent increases in the availability of Cuban publications through the US Interests Section in Havana have made the Agency much less dependent on the LC exchange program than previously. The Interests Section's sources of publications all are controlled by the Cuban Government, however, and could therefore be used as an instrument of harassment against the Interests Section. Any reduction in the Interests Section's access to important publications would mean a decreased supply of valuable Cuban open literature.

6. The NFAC contact regarding this matter is Clarus W. Rice, Director of Central Reference, extension

STAT

STAT

Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

International Exchange Program

FROM:

Director, Office of External Affairs
7D43 Hqs.

EXTENSION

NO.

OEXA 82-2015

DATE

26 AUG 1982

STAT

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. *W**JX*
Executive Director

27 AUG 1982

ed

2.

3.

DDCI

28 AUG 1982

4.

5. *W*

DCI

30 Aug 1982

WJC

6.

7.

D/OEXA *mlg. noted*

3 SEP 1982

8.

D/OEXA Hansen

3 SEP 1982

9.

C/S&P

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

Attached for your consideration and decision is a memo concerning a request by Senator Charles McC. Mathias for a luncheon meeting with you and others at Headquarters for the purpose of discussing the benefits the Agency derives from the International Exchange Program. This office recommends that efforts be made to fulfill the request. The attached has been coordinated with the D/OCR and EA/DDI.

STAT

D/OEXA *L*

Attachments



Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied



Director of Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20520

August 20, 1982

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM TO: ACDA - James Timbie
CIA - [redacted]
JCS - RADM William Williams
NSC - Sven Kraemer
OSD - Richard Perle
OVP - LTC Michael Fry
Negotiator - Ambassador Rowny

FROM:

PM - Jonathan T. Howe

SUBJECT:

Coordination of SALT/START Inquiries

The NSC has requested that the START IG coordinate responses to Congressional inquiries regarding SALT/START issues, such as the recent questions regarding Soviet compliance with SALT agreements. All agencies which receive such inquiries are requested to submit draft replies to the Working Group for interagency clearance. Please make every effort to expedite the review process.

*I think my basic
problem is fixed.*

D.

58 JUL 21 1982

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: OADR

ALX
JOHN H. CHAFFEE, R.I.
RICHARD G. LUGAR, IND.
MALCOLM WALLOP, WYO.
DAVID DURENBERGER, MINN.
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., DEL.
HARRISON H. SCHMITT, N. MEX.

WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DEL.
DANIEL K. INOUE, HAWAII
HENRY M. JACKSON, WASH.
PATRICK J. LEAHY, VT.
LLOYD BENTSEN, TEX.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN., EX OFFICIO
ROBERT C. BYRD, W. VA., EX OFFICIO

ROBERT R. SIMMONS, STAFF DIRECTOR
ABRAM N. SHULSKY, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 400, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

#82-

August 13, 1982

The Honorable John Tower
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear John:

Recently, a number of our colleagues called for Senate investigation of Soviet compliance with the SALT I and SALT II agreements and of current U.S. capabilities to monitor the SALT II Treaty before any action is taken on S.J. Res. 212, which deals with U.S. strategic arms limitation policy. Based on its past and present work on these important, but extremely sensitive matters, we would like to express the willingness of the Select Committee to prepare a report to the Senate addressing any issues relevant to arms control monitoring.


As you know, this Committee has followed developments in and supported the enhancement of U.S. intelligence capabilities to monitor Soviet strategic weapons activities since its establishment in 1976. In 1977, Senators Sparkman and Case, on behalf of the Foreign Relations Committee, asked the Select Committee to prepare a report to the Senate on U.S. capabilities to monitor provisions of the SALT II Treaty then under negotiation. This request was subsequently reaffirmed by Senators Church and Javits. On October 10, 1979, we presented the summary of our Committee's report to an executive session of the Foreign Relations Committee. The full text of that report was subsequently made available to all the Members of the Senate. In that report, the Select Committee reaffirmed its commitment to keep all Committees with responsibility for oversight of U.S. arms control policy apprised of intelligence information of significance in performing their relevant mandated duties.


The Honorable John Tower
Page Two
August 13, 1982

The Select Committee has continued to receive periodic reports from the Intelligence Community on Soviet military activities bearing upon Soviet compliance with the SALT agreements and other arms control treaties. It has made summaries of these monitoring reports available to Members and appropriately cleared staff of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. The Committee also held a hearing in June of this year to update our Members on the Intelligence Community's current capabilities to monitor the various types of strategic arms limitation arrangements that are in effect or under consideration.

For all of these reasons, if the Senate finds it desirable to have a formal review of the very sensitive issues relating to monitoring Soviet strategic military activity, we would suggest that the Select Committee on Intelligence would be the most appropriate body to conduct this work.

Sincerely,


Barry Goldwater
Chairman



Daniel Patrick Moynihan
Vice Chairman

WARDEN, BAKER, JR., TENN.
ESSE, HELMS, N.C.
S. I. KAYAKAWA, CALIF.
RICHARD S. LUGAR, IND.
CHARLES MC C. MATHEWS, JR., MD.
MARTIN L. MARGOLIS, N.Y.
RUDY BOSCHERT, MINN.
LARRY PRESSLER, S. CAR.

CLAIBORNE PELL, R.I.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DEL.
JOHN GLENN, OHIO
PAUL S. SARBANES, MD.
EDWARD BROWDER, NEBR.
PAUL E. TONGER, MASS.
ALAN CRANSTON, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

EDWARD S. SANDERS, STAFF DIRECTOR
SERVIL D. CHRISTIANSON, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

August 11, 1982

The Honorable Eugene V. Rostow
Director
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Washington, D.C. 20451

Dear Dr. Rostow:

Pursuant to Section 37(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, I hereby request your cooperation in providing the Committee with a report detailing:

- (1) the degree to which the U.S. proposal tendered at the first session of START can be verified by existing national technical means;
- (2) whether there has been any significant degradation or alteration in the capacity of the United States to verify, using national technical means, Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty;
- (3) the degree to which the United States can detect, using existing national technical means, Soviet actions which would undercut the SALT I Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms or the unratified SALT II Treaty;
- (4) the number of professional personnel assigned to arms control verification on a full-time basis by each Government agency; and
- (5) the amount and percentage of research funds expended by the Agency for the purpose of analyzing issues relating to arms control verification.

In addition, I would appreciate your assistance in providing the Committee with a second report assessing the record of Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty and the SALT I Interim Agreement and the consistency or inconsistency of Soviet actions vis-a-vis the U.S. policy of reciprocal SALT II restraint.


U.S. ARMS CONTROL
AND
DISARMAMENT
AGENCY
82 AUG 13 10 30
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/82 BY 1045

-2-

While I recognize that these two reports must necessarily be classified, I would request that they be accompanied by an unclassified summary.

Thank you for your cooperation on this matter.

Sincerely,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'C. H. Percy', is written over the typed name and extends downwards.

Charles H. Percy
Chairman

CHP:gom

6F20

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 8, 1982

STAT

Dr. Eugene Rostow
Director, United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Rostow:

The issue of verifiability is at the heart of the arms control process. There is a widespread sentiment in Congress that no significant progress in arms control can be made unless the people of the United States are assured of the verifiability of any agreement, or proposed agreement.

We are therefore concerned that ACDA has not taken the initiative to assure Congress and the American people that it is addressing the issue of verifiability in a forthright manner. We note that ACDA was very slow in recreating the Verification Bureau, and that even now, a year after you took office, the Bureau has not been fully staffed. In addition, there are key issues on verifiability which, to our knowledge, ACDA has neither examined nor reported on to Congress despite the intense public interest in their resolution. These issues include:

- the verifiability of the unratified but not withdrawn Threshold Test Ban Treaty;
- the verifiability of the various nuclear weapons freeze proposals;
- the verifiability of the President's START proposal;
- the presence of any significant degradations in the capacity of the United States to verify:
 - a) the SALT II Treaty
 - b) the Threshold Test Ban Treaty
 - c) the Limited Test Ban Treaty
 - d) the SALT I ABM Treaty
 - e) the SALT I Interim Agreement.

We note that Section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, the "Derwinski Amendment," provides ACDA with the authority to initiate such reports to Congress. To date, ACDA has not taken this initiative. In addition, Section 37 also allows the Congress to request the Director of ACDA to make such reports.

Accordingly, we would ask that you report as soon as possible to the Senate Intelligence, Foreign Relations, and Armed Services Committees and to the full Congress on an unclassified basis about the verifiability of the above arms control treaties and proposals.

Dr. Eugene Rostow--page 2

and also, on any degradation of U.S. verification capacity. In addition, we request that you assess the effects of Soviet concealment measures and altered practices upon the verifiability of the above treaties and proposals. We further request that these reports should be received by the Congress before any new arms control treaties or proposals are voted on.

As you know, serious charges have been leveled in the press concerning recent Soviet violations of several arms control treaties or agreements. Given the urgency of the forthcoming floor debate on SALT II and other arms control proposals, it is crucial that the validity of these charges be aired and brought to the attention of the American public. Specifically, we request that you answer the following questions:

- 1.) Has classified U.S. intelligence data ever been revealed to the Soviets during the SALT process? If so, can it be made public? Has the SALT process jeopardized any U.S. intelligence sources and methods?
- 2.) Has the U.S. ever provided the Soviets photography of deactivated U.S. ABM sites and deactivated U.S. ICBM sites? Have the Soviets ever reciprocated with photography of any of their own installations?
- 3.) Has the U.S. ever provided the Soviets with classified U.S. data on new U.S. Early Warning radars, such as "Pave Paws"? Have the Soviets ever provided the U.S. with similar data?
- 4.) Have the Soviets ever charged the United States with deliberate concealment, which in effect is a violation of SALT I and SALT II?
- 5.) Given the well-known fact that the Soviets have expanded their strategic concealment, camouflage, and deception activities since 1972, despite the SALT I and II bans on deliberate concealment; and given U.S. recognition that the well-known Soviet camouflage net at a missile test range is acknowledged to have constituted deliberate concealment, has the U.S. ever charged the Soviets with deliberate concealment? Is it possible that the Soviets have charged the U.S. with deliberate concealment, while the U.S. has not similarly charged the Soviets?
- 6.) Since SALT began in 1969, has intelligence data related to SALT ever been embargoed from and within the intelligence community, either temporarily or permanently? Has any such data also been withheld from Congress? Is there an Executive Order which provides that CIA shall receive all intelligence data collected within the U.S. government?

Dr, Eugene Rostow--page 3

- 7.) If the U.S. tried to ban a missile the size of the Soviet SS-19 in 1972 under SALT I, in an attempt to limit Soviet counterforce capabilities, does the SS-19's deployment allowed under SALT I and II result in a reduction in U.S. national security? Does the Administration nevertheless believe that the Soviet SALT I compliance record does not reduce U.S. national security?
- 8.) Have the Soviets ever falsified a report of the number of ABM or ICBM launchers they have deactivated? Were all of those launchers required to be deactivated ever properly deactivated?
- 9.) Have the Soviets ever claimed that "trust" was involved in SALT compliance?
- 10.) What was the time span between first U.S. detection of each possible Soviet SALT violation, and its final resolution in the SCC? Did the U.S. ever acquiesce in the Soviet position?
- 11.) Is there any classified evidence of Soviet negotiating deception in SALT? Was a classified study on Soviet SALT deception ever withheld or suppressed within the Executive Branch, or withheld from Congress?
- 12.) If Defense Department and military posture statements have recognized that during the 1969-1979 SALT decade the strategic balance has shifted against the U.S. and in Soviet favor, how has this shift in the balance affected U.S. leverage in enforcing Soviet compliance with SALT I?
- 13.) Has there been any evidence in the past year suggesting Soviet violations of the SALT I ABM Treaty, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the SALT I Interim Agreement, the BW Convention, the SALT II Treaty, and the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement of 1962?
- 14.) Has there been any diplomatic challenge in the past year to Soviet violations of these agreements?
- 15.) Precisely how many Soviet SS-7 and SS-8 ICBMs were fully dismantled according to the SCC procedures each month between October 1975 and the present? How many SS-7 SS-8 ICBMs were required to be in fully deactivated status each month between October 1975 and the present? Were Soviet reports on their deactivation ever at variance with U.S. intelligence data? Was former Secretary of State Vance's public statement that the Soviets were in full compliance on deactivations in June 1976 correct?
- 16.) Were there any Soviet tests of surface to air missiles or radars in an ABM mode since 1975?

Dr. Eugene Rostow--page 4

- 17.) Were any Soviet SAM missiles ever tested against Soviet tactical or strategic ballistic missiles?
- 18.) How many Soviet nuclear weapons tests since 1963 have vented either solid or gaseous debris? How many U.S. diplomatic complaints have been made? What was their result?
- 19.) List all Soviet nuclear weapons tests and their yields since March 1976 which had a central value over 150 kilotons. Explain how our yield calculation methodology has changed since 1974. Explain the confidence levels in central values well above 150 kilotons.
- 20.) Have the Soviets introduced ICBM equipment into a deactivated old ICBM complex, in possible violation of the SALT I Interim Agreement? Have the Soviets introduced ICBM equipment at a medium range ballistic missile complex, also in possible violation of the SALT I Interim Agreement? Have the Soviets introduced mobile ICBM equipment into a deactivated old ICBM complex?
- 21.) Are the reports of Soviet construction of large phased array battle management radars correct? Has this issue been raised with the Soviets?

We would appreciate receiving complete answers to these questions as soon as reasonably possible.

Sincerely yours,

Leslie Helms

Roger W. Jensen

BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ., CHAIRMAN
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, N.Y., VICE CHAIRMAN
JAKE GARN, UTAH
JOHN H. CHAFFE, R.I.
RICHARD G. LUGAR, IND.
MALCOLM WALLOP, WYO.
DAVID DURENBERGER, MINN.
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., DEL.
HARRISON H. SCHMITT, N. MEX.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DEL.
DANIEL K. INOUE, HAWAII
HENRY M. JACKSON, WASH.
PATRICK J. LEAHY, VT.
LLOYD BENTSEN, TEX.

UKAFT

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 400, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN., EX OFFICIO
ROBERT C. BYRD, W. VA., EX OFFICIO

ROBERT R. SIMMONS, STAFF DIRECTOR
ABRAM N. SHULSKY, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

August 3, 1982

The Honorable Charles H. Percy
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

*4 Tower
Hatfield*

Dear Chuck:

Recently, a number of our colleagues called for Senate investigation of Soviet compliance with the SALT I and SALT II agreements and of current U.S. capabilities to monitor the SALT II Treaty before any action is taken on S.J. Res. 212, which deals with U.S. strategic arms limitation policy. Based on its past and present work on these important, but extremely sensitive matters, we would like to express the willingness of the Select Committee to prepare a report to the Senate addressing any issues relevant to arms control monitoring.

As you know, this Committee has followed developments in and supported the enhancement of U.S. intelligence capabilities to monitor Soviet strategic weapons activities since its establishment in 1976. In 1977, Senators Sparkman and Case, on behalf of the Foreign Relations Committee, asked the Select Committee to prepare a report to the Senate on U.S. capabilities to monitor provisions of the SALT II Treaty then under negotiation. This request was subsequently reaffirmed by Senators Church and Javits. On October 10, 1979, we presented the summary of our Committee's report to an executive session of the Foreign Relations Committee. The full text of that report was subsequently made available to all the Members of the Senate. In that report, the Select Committee reaffirmed its commitment to keep all Committees with responsibility for oversight of U.S. arms control policy apprised of intelligence information of significance in performing their relevant mandated duties.

VKRAFT

The Honorable Charles H. Percy
Page Two
August 3, 1982

The Select Committee has continued to receive periodic reports from the Intelligence Community on Soviet military activities bearing upon Soviet compliance with the SALT agreements and other arms control treaties. It has made summaries of these monitoring reports available to Members and appropriately cleared staff of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. The Committee also held a hearing in June of this year to update our Members on the Intelligence Community's current capabilities to monitor the various types of strategic arms limitation arrangements that are in effect or under consideration.

For all of these reasons, if the Senate finds it desirable to have a formal review of the very sensitive issues relating to monitoring Soviet strategic military activity, we would suggest that the Select Committee on Intelligence would be the most appropriate body to conduct this work.

Sincerely,

Barry Goldwater
Chairman

Daniel Patrick Moynihan
Vice Chairman